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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks into the communication factor in Greek foreign policy. It 
aims at identifying communication patterns and models used to convey 
Greek foreign policy positions abroad. It examines critically the efficacy 
of the applied practice and argues that the communication factor has 
been disregarded by foreign policy-makers, making successful promotion 
of Greek foreign policy problematic and hurting the image of the country 
internationally. The paper suggests that Greece should invest in public 
diplomacy, especially relationship building, in order to communicate its 
foreign policy more effectively.  
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The Communication Factor in Greek Foreign Policy: 
An Analysis 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The scope of this paper is to examine Greek foreign policy from a 
communication point of view. There is an underlying difficulty in 
analysing this aspect of foreign policy, which lies in the combined use of 
concepts, methodological and analytical tools from different realms, 
namely International Relations and Political Science on the one hand and 
Communication and Media on the other.  Despite the association 
between these disciplines, certain aspects of this relationship have been 
inadequately explored. Gilboa points out that ‘scholars studying foreign 
policy making often ignore the roles and effects of the media and public 
opinion, and their colleagues in communication often ignore foreign 
policy in studies of roles and effects’ (2002: 732). Similarly, Robinson 
observes that ‘the discipline of International Relations tends to pay little 
attention to public opinion and media’ (2008: 138).  
Moreover, diplomacy and foreign policy, though closely intertwined, are 
not synonymous. As Kamath notes ‘foreign policy is the totality of a 
nation’s relations with another state or other states in the International 
Political System. Diplomacy does not make policy. Diplomacy is one of 
the several instrumentalities available to a nation to secure their foreign 
policy objectives’ (1990: 16). The interest of this paper is not to analyse 
  
2 
foreign policy positions – i.e., what they are, how they are formed or 
why - but to see how they are communicated to specific audiences. 
Since diplomacy is concerned with the implementation of foreign policy, 
this paper will focus on diplomacy put forward to promote foreign policy 
positions. It becomes evident that diplomacy and communication are 
thoroughly interlinked since diplomacy is unthinkable without 
communication. ‘Whenever communication ceases, the body of 
international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead’ (Van Dinh 1987: 
8). All the same, there is considerable dearth of literature specifically 
linking communication and foreign policy in the way it is developed here, 
i.e., on communicating foreign policy. This relationship is only partially 
treated in the literature and almost entirely through the lens of the 
influence of the media on foreign policy formation.  
Public diplomacy is one result of this transformation. The concept of 
public diplomacy is a theoretical and analytical challenge in itself, and 
there is much controversy around its definition and meaning (Roberts 
2007), or how it is related to traditional diplomacy or foreign policy. As 
the communication face of foreign policy, public diplomacy is the central 
concept in this paper so it is necessary to explore it in depth. 
 
2.  The Concept of Public Diplomacy 
The concept of public diplomacy has been quite controversial and many 
definitions have been put forward. They share, however, some common 
elements: (a) the aim to exert influence on foreign public audiences; (b) 
the interaction with non-governmental actors; (c) the distinction 
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between old/traditional and new/public diplomacy. The idea of public 
diplomacy is not new, although it has re-emerged dynamically after the 
end of the Cold War and more countries are consciously and actively 
concerned about public diplomacy than was previously the case. 
For the US Defence Science Board (2004) ‘public diplomacy seeks 
through the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting relationships 
and receptivity to a nation’s culture, values and policies. It seeks also to 
influence attitudes and mobilise publics in ways that support policies and 
interests’ (in Waller 2007: 33). Roberts defines public diplomacy as ‘a 
governmental or governmentally funded foreign policy activity. Its 
objective is to create, for a given country, as positive a climate as 
possible among foreign publics in order to facilitate the explanation and 
hopefully acceptance of its foreign policy’ (2007: 45). It is important to 
note that public diplomacy unfolds in the course of time and that public 
diplomacy is a foreign policy activity primarily orchestrated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1
 Public diplomacy is principally occupied with 
managing information on a country and its foreign policy, using widely 
information and communication technologies. As the flow of 
information has increased and reaching different audiences has been 
immensely facilitated by the new technologies, the magnitude of public 
diplomacy has increased.   
Mark Leonard identifies three dimensions of public diplomacy: reactive, 
proactive and relationship building (2002: 10). Time is the core element 
in this categorisation. These dimensions work jointly with three different 
                                                 
1
 Many actors outside the MFA and often not controlled by it (NGOs, think tanks etc.) 
conduct activities which can have a ‘public diplomacy effect’. However, the interest of this 
paper is public diplomacy funded and conducted by governmental authorities.  
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’spheres’:  political/military, economic and societal/cultural (ibid: 10), 
describing the type of activities in place.  
Reactive public diplomacy usually responds to a special event or 
important piece of news. Leonard describes this first dimension of public 
diplomacy as ‘news management’ (2002: 12-13). When faced with 
negative press coverage, a country and its embassies should be ready to 
respond. In some cases such a response presupposes an agreed planned 
course of action, taking the form of communication crisis response 
plans. In terms of public diplomacy this could be achieved through 
interventions in the media or even campaigns already designed to be 
implemented when particular issues emerge. Positive coverage does not 
pose a problem of course, but it could definitely be taken further. Also, 
the frequency with which some news appears provides a good 
opportunity to promote foreign policy positions to foreign audience. For 
instance, the annual report of the European Commission on the 
candidate countries for accession provide  an excellent opportunity to 
talk about Greek positions on the issues of FYROM or Turkey to 
European publics. The second dimension of public diplomacy - proactive 
public - diplomacy, unfolds in weeks or months. It takes public diplomacy 
a step further not only in terms of timeframe, but in terms of objectives 
and means. While reactive public diplomacy deals with news 
management, proactive public diplomacy deals with perception 
management. In other words, it is concerned with the image and 
perception of a country. Successful management of this perception is 
important if messages are to be communicated effectively. The image 
that foreign publics hold of a country can influence their reception of 
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messages. Unlike the first dimension of public diplomacy where action is 
mostly driven by events proactive public diplomacy allows all three 
spheres of public diplomacy to be smoothly developed. The idea here is 
to put down a number of messages (in the military, economic or cultural 
field) and play them out. Surely enough this requires coordination and 
forward planning, because the planned activities usually fall under the 
mandate and responsibility of different institutions or public services. So, 
cooperation in the areas of culture, tourism and trade, for example, 
might be needed. At this stage, public diplomacy has more lasting goals 
than in the first stage. While in the latter case the aim of public 
diplomacy is mostly to reverse any negative coverage caused by running 
events, in this case the aim is to disseminate specific messages reflecting 
the perception a country wishes to promote for itself. Leonard names 
this dimension of public diplomacy ‘strategic communication’ (ibid: 14). 
For example, a series of seminars on Greek and Balkan history, co-
organised by the embassies in association with local institutions, could 
offer the opportunity to present to a large, foreign and young audience 
the Greek view on the Macedonian question.  
Deciding on the message(s) which would support to create a desired 
perception of a country is of course a huge task. Powell suggests that 
very few, preferably one message, should capture what is wished to be 
promoted, since peoples’ constant daily exposure to  loads of 
information diminishes the possibility of them recalling most of the 
messages they receive (in Leonard 2002:15-16). The message should give 
the country an identity and create connotations. Therefore, it should be 
imaginative and repetitive. The advertising campaign of the Greek 
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Tourist Organisation is a case in point: the slogan changes far too often, 
if not every year, every two years, from ‘Live your myth in Greece’ 
(2008) to ‘Kalimera’ (2009) to ‘You in Greece’ (2010) ‘.  
Relationship-building is the third dimension of public diplomacy 
(Leonard 2002: 18-21) and the most lasting one. Relationship building 
develops over years and aims at building contacts and creating networks 
of communication among peers: media, non-governmental actors, 
academia and so on. The purpose of relationship-building is to exchange 
ideas and experiences and ultimately develop a deep understanding of 
the country and its culture. By enhancing knowledge of a country and its 
people, one gets a profound insight on the mentality and behaviour of 
people, on their beliefs and values, and can therefore better understand 
their views and positions in matter of politics, economy and culture. So, 
even if one becomes critical about what they experience, what matters 
really is the exposure and involvement in a different cultural 
environment. Joseph Nye eloquently describes this ‘learning’ and 
intermingling procedure as ‘complexifing the thinking’ [of people] (in 
Leonard 2002: 19). 
Building relationships is different from disseminating messages, which is 
central in proactive public diplomacy, since a relationship is a two-way 
process. This dimension of public diplomacy allows the three spheres to 
be fully developed and provides the space and time to explore and 
utilise several aspects of mutual and common features between the 
parties.  Relationships are not static and it takes time and effort to 
maintain and cultivate them. Sharing common visions in politics, cultural 
and educational exchange programmes, seminars and conferences or 
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joint projects are means of creating bonds between states and their 
people.  
Although the three dimensions might exist separately, they are well 
connected. Relationship building establishes the basis of creating any 
kind of connection between two parties. When the relationship has been 
created and has been stabilised, it has prepared the ground for receiving 
messages and managing individual issues. So, when the time comes to 
discuss matters, the background work that has been done facilitates the 
process.  
Ultimately, public diplomacy could increase people’s knowledge, 
familiarity and appreciation for a given country and hence increase the 
possibility to influence the public to develop a favourable view 
concerning matters in the country’s interests. Public diplomacy 
constitutes an excellent instrument of a state’s soft power (Nye 2008: 
95). Nonetheless, this does not mean that public diplomacy is a ‘soft’ 
instrument, for it pursues a variety of objectives ranging from cultural 
and political dialogue to alliance management and conflict prevention 
(Melissen 2005: 14). 
 
3.  Public diplomacy and target audiences 
When a country wishes to promote its foreign policy priorities, it needs 
to address different groups of people. One major group is foreign policy 
makers. The second important group is the media and the third is the 
general public. The last two are the focus of public diplomacy. 
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The general public is perhaps the most difficult audience to handle 
under any circumstances. It is heterogeneous, unpredictable, indifferent, 
opinionated, passive, active, informed, misinformed, multifaceted, 
diverse, mutable and, needless to say, numerous. It does remain, 
however, the primary target of any communication policy of a large 
scale. Given its inherent complexity but also the imperative need to 
manage it, it is necessary to learn about it. Quantitative and qualitative 
categories as well as second and third dimension public diplomacy 
activities can contribute in acquiring profound knowledge of any 
concerned public.  
It is also essential to mention that influencing the public on foreign 
policy is a great challenge, because it is often burdened with fixed views 
and stereotypes, it is ‘ill-informed […] and hence has no good judgement 
when it comes to foreign policy’ (Lippmann in Kamath 1990:240). As a 
result, the public is less susceptible to change views than knowledgeable 
audiences.  The public is generally indifferent when on foreign policy 
except for landmark events, such as 9/11 or the 1999 Kardak/Imia crisis.  
The media is the second major group public diplomacy aims at. Public 
diplomacy aims at including the media in as many activities as possible 
both as a target group and as means of reaching to and enhancing the 
knowledge of the public. 
It is important to have profound knowledge of a country’s media culture, 
namely the legal framework, possible restrictions in the freedom of the 
press, leading media opinion makers and so on. Undoubtedly, the 
Internet has affected the way the media works and the game of 
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information is played under new rules. News webpages, blogs and online 
forums create space for expression and dissemination of information 
and form public opinion. At the same time, the influence of traditional 
media remains strong in shaping public opinion. So, the media offer 
great opportunities to present views and opinions, engage in dialogue, 
give interviews, etc., as a part of a public diplomacy strategy to promote 
a country’s views. 
Moreover, the media is itself a target group; therefore public diplomacy 
officials need to develop personal relationship with selective, influential 
media representatives and journalists. Journalists covering foreign policy 
are a knowledgeable and experienced group, in contrast to the public. 
Consequently, they can be quite influential when conveying views on 
foreign policy. This relationship can be further supportive to public 
diplomacy goals, since it a) provides an immediate channel of 
information about the public; b) it can feed the public with targeted 
messages.
2
  
 
4.  Communication and foreign policy in Greece 
The relation between communication and foreign policy has not been a 
good one in the case of Greece. As Kapopoulos eloquently puts it 
“communication of foreign policy in Greece has stayed in the 1970-80s”.
3
 
In fact, with very few exceptions, communication has virtually never 
                                                 
2
 Public diplomacy officials pursue contacts with other groups as well, such as think tanks, 
civil society organisations, the diaspora etc. Although they can assist considerably to the 
goals of public diplomacy – especially diaspora – the main focus of this paper is the public 
and the media, because they are a sine qua non for public diplomacy. 
3
 Interview with G. Kapopoulos on 5 November 2010. 
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been taken into account when promotion of foreign policy was the 
matter
4
 so even claiming that communication is to foreign policy 
‘incidental to the larger process’ (Nimmo and Sanders 1981: 391) could 
be an understatement. Quite surprisingly, the need to communicate 
foreign policy to foreign publics has been recognised by policy makers. 
The ‘no relations’ between communication and foreign policy should be 
attributed to a number of reasons that reflect the structure, means and 
content of foreign policy in Greece.  
As mentioned in the first part, communication policy is an instrument, a 
means to promote foreign policy to foreign publics. In Greece, 
communication has not been viewed as such, so no structures have been 
created to support a system of promotion of foreign policy positions 
through public diplomacy channels. There is no ‘organisational system’, 
as Snyder puts it (1962: 95), no system of relationships, allocation of 
responsibilities, scenario planning or problem solving that could build a 
short and long term communication policy. From a theoretical point of 
view, communication policy has not been acknowledged as a foreign 
policy instrument and therefore no attention has been paid on how to 
develop its possibilities. Actually, foreign policy goals have been pursued 
mostly, if not exclusively, through traditional diplomacy paths, i.e. 
government to government relations. Such approach has limited the 
available audience leaving out the public. It barely triggered debate and 
dialogue between different publics to develop a different view of foreign 
policy, even concerning publics of immediate interest, such as the 
                                                 
4
 All nine interviewees admitted to the importance and need of communicating foreign 
policy to different audiences, although equally admitting that this has never been the case, 
with very few exceptions.  
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Turkish one or the one in FYROM. Any efforts are usually initiated by 
NGOs or think tanks, but are generally not government funded, so they 
cannot account for government policy. For instance, ELIAMEP (Hellenic 
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy), in its long history, has 
organised many seminars, conferences and round tables concerning 
Greek-Turkish relations or FYROM. But ELIAMEP has its own agenda in 
research and activities and does not follow the agenda of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
Secondly, foreign policy functions in an environment of deficient 
structures. Weak structures in turn support weak mechanisms. More 
often than not, there are no mechanisms at all. Although the broad 
infrastructure is there (e.g. there is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
bureaucracy, which is supposed to link the different parts, is 
dysfunctional and ineffective. For example, there is no joint platform of 
cooperation between different ministries to form a common strategy for 
public diplomacy, each one contributing its own ideas, means and 
resources. The reality instead is overlapping responsibilities and 
individual action, without central planning.  
In terms of lack or insufficiency of institutions, public diplomacy makes 
no exception. In most European countries and the United States the 
structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes a division of public 
diplomacy and public affairs or information. In Greece, this division is 
called the Information and Public Diplomacy Department (Υπηρεσία 
Ενημέρωσης και Δημόσιας Διπλωματίας). It is headed by the Ministry’s 
Spokesperson and its primary task is to inform the media covering 
diplomatic issues of the activities and progress in foreign policy issues. 
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The Public Diplomacy branch, to our knowledge, stays insofar inactive in 
terms of public diplomacy, at least as having defined and analysed in this 
paper.  It is not engaged in any sort of research and planning of short or 
long term activities that would fall under any of the three dimensions of 
public diplomacy as elaborated earlier, though the Ministry’s Spokesman 
suggest that there is a wish to activate the public diplomacy branch to 
this direction.
5
 According to the head of the Department (the Ministry’s 
Spokesperson), since 2010 the Ministry has been going through a period 
of restructuring and of redefining the means of foreign policy conduct, 
shifting the emphasis onto society, i.e. passing information directly to 
the people. This new ‘framework of strategic communication for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ aims at making both the Ministry and the 
embassies more extroverted in order to better communicate the 
messages of the Ministry  - and the Greek government as a whole – to 
foreign publics (Delavekouras 2010). As Delavekouras himself admits, 
‘this requires a change of culture in the Ministry, the embassies and the 
press offices. The personnel should become more open and extroverted 
and reach even more to the public’ (ibid).    
In practice, in the Greek Embassies public diplomacy is conducted by the 
press officers, whose main preoccupations are a) contact with the press, 
and b) enhancing relations with the public. Press offices follow local and 
international press, create and maintain relations with the media and 
initiate public relations activities, such as seminars, conferences, 
educational programmes, promotional events and so on. Their aim is to 
identify features that could be cultivated to eventually bind the people 
                                                 
5
 Interview with Delavekouras on 4 December 2010. 
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of the countries bilaterally and enhance their understanding of each 
other. This is a huge task, in itself requiring resources and 
communication management skills that go beyond mere diplomatic 
training. This is hardly the training a career diplomat receives. It is, 
however, the training that press officers undergo.  
The Secretariat General of Information and Communication is a 
pertinent public body designed to deal with communication policy. The 
Secretariat is staffed by press officers and journalists. As a highly 
qualified body of public officials (an exception, rather than the rule, in 
the civil service)
6
, the press officers receive their training on 
communication, marketing and public diplomacy techniques at the 
National School of Public Administration. Abroad, they are the public 
face of the embassy. In Greece, they support the work of foreign media 
in Greece, supply other government institutions with incoming 
information from the press offices and produce reports based on 
international media coverage on issues related to Greek foreign policy 
matters. They do not participate, however, in any kind of 
communication policy planning administered either by the Secretariat, 
or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and contrary to standard practice 
abroad, the press officers are not staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Cooperation between the Secretariat and the Ministry is at times close 
and fruitful, but there is a smouldering rivalry concerning respective 
                                                 
6
 According to the 2010 census, out of the 768.009 civil servants only 10% has a master’s 
degree (‘A rabbit for IMF’ [Enas lagos gia to DNT], Eleftherotypia, 19/09/2010, p.41, at 
http://enet.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/09/190910/index.html. Fifty-eight percent (58%) of 
press officers have a master’s degree, while 5.6% hold a PhD as well. A 39% speaks three 
foreign languages (that is other than Greek) and almost 50% speak an uncommon foreign 
language (e.g. Finnish, Jewish, Japanese, Arab, Portuguese, etc). 
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competences fuelled partly by an overlap of responsibilities – at times 
unclearly defined – in which communication diplomacy is divided 
between the two institutions, hence hindering the actual 
implementation of any communication policy.
7
 Press officers claim the 
realm of public diplomacy for themselves, as the sole and only body in 
Greek public administration trained to conduct public diplomacy, while 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has ‘institutionalised’ this with a 
Department. It is true that the Secretariat does have the resources 
(human and financial) and the means (works directly with foreign and 
Greek press, foreign correspondents and the Greek Press Offices located 
in selected Greek embassies) to build a public diplomacy strategy. 
Nevertheless, the present structure of the Secretariat does not permit 
the least the deployment of its potentials.  
The Secretariat is one big paradox of the Greek administration and 
reflects quite powerfully the absence of vision and strategy in foreign 
policy and communication policy. For once, the press officers are not 
staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the Secretariat does 
not seem to be finding its place in any Greek governmental scheme. 
Known until 2004 as the Ministry of Press, it has shifted ‘host 
institutions’ ever since.  Under the first Karamanlis administration (2004-
2007), the Ministry of Press was abolished and replaced by the 
Secretariat General of Communication and the Secretariat General of 
Information.
8
 From 2004 to 2009 the Secretariats fell directly under the 
                                                 
7
 See the law N. 2594/2008 article 2 on the function and role of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and law N. 3166/2003, article 4, on the role and function of the Press Offices of the 
Secretariat General of Information and Communication. 
8
 N. 3242/2004 (in Greek), at http://www.et.gr/idocs-
nph/search/pdfViewerForm.html?args=5C7QrtC22wGQ_kZuUB4NxXdtvSoClrL8sN_CI5tJ5zV5
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authority of the Prime Minister. From January 2009, following a 
governmental shuffle, until October 2009 (when early national elections 
took place), the Secretariats moved to the Ministry of Interior. After 
PASOK took office in October 2009, the two Secretariats were merged 
into one (only one Secretary General was appointed) and restored to 
their former status under the Prime Minister, with the Government 
Spokesperson as their political head. The government reshuffle of 
September 2010 moved the Secretariats back to the Ministry of Interior. 
The reshuffle of June 2011 has placed them back under the direct 
authority of the Prime Minister. Moreover, in July 2011 a presidential 
decree has recreated two Secretariats: the Secretariat General of 
Information and Communication; and the Secretariat General of Mass 
Media. The press officers fall under the former.  
When no government can decide what to do with a public body, two 
things are possible: a) it has no policy or plan whatsoever; b) the public 
institution is redundant. In this case, both are true. If there was an actual 
communication policy to serve foreign policy, the Secretariat General of 
Information and Communication would have been abolished and had its 
personnel reassigned.  
Thirdly, as anywhere else in Greek politics, communication policy is a 
highly personalised state of affairs, as a result of the absence of 
structures and functional institutions. Clientelism often prevails over 
standardised processes, jeopardising continuity and consistency in the 
public sector. Key positions (such as the General and Special Secretary), 
                                                                                                                                            
MXD0LzQTLWPU9yLzB8V68knBzLCmTXKaO6fpVZ6Lx9hLslJUqeiQlqVK3b5Pb7RKErCKwzM23
OtwUkphgdv1PQM6ikZMtto, last visited on 19/12/2010.  
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instead of being occupied by career civil servants are subject to political 
bargaining, serving personal political ambitions rather than the public 
interest. The Secretary General should have profound knowledge of the 
Ministry and the personnel serve a vision and set goals. Unfortunately, 
Secretaries General change far too often to allow a Ministry to set and 
implement any action plan. Moreover, there is poor, if any, participation 
of career civil servants in the actual planning or decision making of the 
Ministries. When it comes to high policy levels, Ministers invite 
independent advisors, often with no relation or knowledge whatsoever 
with the work of the Ministry, leaving experienced qualified personnel 
misused and squandered.  
Fourth, Greece has only belatedly recognised the potential benefits of 
communication policy.  Opening up foreign policy to the public has long 
been a reality for countries such as the US and the UK (Cohen 1986, 
Roberts 2007) but has not been embedded in Greek foreign policy, 
despite having recognised its importance.
9
 Communication policy 
provides an excellent opportunity for small or medium sized countries to 
increase their visibility in the international political arena. As Ellis 
recognises, ‘the need for communication policy in Greece is 
disproportional to its size. Everybody is going to listen to the US, no 
matter the subject, but not a small country’.
10
 Greece does have foreign 
policy goals that would eventually need the support of even ‘remote’ 
countries, such as China. Communication policy, especially long term, 
can create willing listeners for the Greek views.  
                                                 
9
 See footnote 6. 
10
 Interview with A. Ellis on 5 November 2010. 
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What was underlined and heavily emphasised by all interviewees is that 
there is no standardised process of communicating foreign policy 
positions.  Communication has never been on the discussion agenda of 
the Council of Foreign Policy, a consultative body to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
11
 Communication of foreign policy, either government to 
government or government to public, is a matter of individuals who 
replace the absent institutions of the Greek state. There are no 
supportive mechanisms, no strategic planning and this does not change 
under different governments.    
Having examined the link between communication and foreign policy in 
Greece, we will shift the focus now on specific foreign policy cases to see 
how communication has been played out. 
 
5.  Communication policy in foreign policy 
Greek-Turkish relations and FYROM’s name issue have long dominated 
the Greek foreign policy agenda. According to Greece, Turkey is a 
revisionist state whose long-term goal is to change the status quo of the 
Aegean Sea in its favour. FYROM’s goal is irredentism against the Greek 
part of Macedonia, more eloquently indicated by its constitutional name 
(‘Macedonia’), which is like red rag to a bull for Greece. In both cases, 
the issues between the two countries have remained essentially 
unresolved since their appearance. There is still no agreement on 
FYROM’s name, nor has there been any substantial progress in the issues 
dividing Greece and Turkey over the Aegean (constitutional shelf, 
                                                 
11
 Interview with M. Koppa on 1 November 2010. 
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territorial waters, airspace, demilitarisation of the Aegean islands, FIR
12
). 
Supposing that Greece’s long-term goal is to preserve the Aegean status 
quo and prevent the recognition of FYROM as Macedonia, Greek foreign 
policy has failed. The status quo has indeed not changed but the cost of 
preserving it has been high.
13
 FYROM has been recognised with its 
constitutional name by 133 countries,
14
 including many European Union 
member states. The United Nations has 193 members so that makes 
almost 70% (including all of the permanent members of the Security 
Council except France) of the world’s nations.  
Over the years Greece has gained less understanding and sympathy over 
its positions. This should be largely attributed to the rigid, introverted 
and ethnocentric approach to foreign policy. This means that Greece has 
been concerned with its own problems and has stayed behind in 
following the European and international agenda.
15
 What is more, 
Greece has failed to make its counterparts interested in its issues 
because it has failed to associate these issues to the international 
agenda and to listen to the problems of the others.
16
 
Moreover, Greece has tried to convey its position mostly, if not 
exclusively, through traditional diplomacy channels. Reaching out to the 
public opinion of the concerned countries has not been on the agenda. 
                                                 
12
 Flight Information Region. 
13
 Dogfights between Greek and Turkish aircrafts are almost everyday practice. This is 
extremely costly not only in terms of resources and money but also of lives, as many Greek 
soldiers have lost their lives in such fights or similar military exercises (at least three during 
the last decade). From 2000 to 2009 the Greek-Turkish dogfights cost 450 million Euros 
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The existent and on-going mistrust and cautiousness towards the 
respective people proves the case. The rigid, introverted and 
ethnocentric approach to foreign policy was reflected to the 
communication of it as well. Both at the government to government 
level and at government to public conveying foreign policy has been 
problematic. Presenting a case on a “good” versus a “bad guy” basis or 
“right” versus “wrong” has not been proven productive. Greece presents 
its positions disregarding the European political context and it barely 
listens to other countries. While sticking to its own problems, it stays 
aside of the contemporary debates resulting in European policies, 
ultimately working against its own interests: diplomacy is a multilevel 
give and take game where empathy is vital; what might not be 
interesting to you could be crucial for someone else, so listening and 
comprehending others is important if you want your case to be heard.
17
 
For many years, Greece has been promoting its positions to its 
counterparts by insisting on their rightness and by reporting Turkish 
activities against Greece (e.g. violation of the airspace). This 
monotonous repetition of ‘victimisation’ of Greece and Turkey’s 
aggressive activities has brought fatigue to many of Greece’s 
counterparts, turning even the most open listeners to indifferent 
audience. As Antonaros puts it “how would Greece feel if Spain talked 
and talked continuously about its differences with Morocco?”
18
 
Moreover, despite the repetition, international public opinion has no 
true knowledge of Greece’s differences with Turkey, or what Greek 
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 Ibid. 
18
 Interview with E. Antonaros on 4 November 2010. 
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positions are.
19
 The absence of any kind of organised plan or activity for 
the promotion of Greek foreign policy positions is, as Koppa adds, the 
reason why “our positions are not easily understood”.
20
  
Apart from Cyprus’s accession to the European Union in 2004, no major 
development took place in Greek-Turkish relations during the last ten 
years. There has been no tension and relations have remained calm. Yet, 
the issues still remain open. In case of a settlement, the great challenge 
for Greek foreign policy would not be as much how to communicate this 
to the international public opinion, but to the Greek one, as it will be 
explained later on. 
Relations with FYROM are at a standstill, at times in deterioration, 
following nationalist outbursts from FYROM.
21
 Since 1991, when 
nationalist sentiment in Greece over the name of the new state was 
extremely high, Greece has actually moved back from its original 
position, according to which ‘Macedonia’ or its derivatives would not be 
accepted. Now, composite names such as ‘Democracy of New 
Macedonia’ or ‘North Macedonia’ are the names suggested by Greece.
22
  
Managing the name issue was, from a communication point of view, a 
disaster. Greece has had sever difficulty in conveying its position on 
FYROM: ‘nobody is really interested when talking about Alexander the 
Great. This means nothing to Europeans. Instead, we could have talked 
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 For example, renaming Skopje’s airport to Alexander the Great airport (2006), presenting 
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22
 Let it be noted that such were the names that FYROM was too eager to accept in 1991. 
  
21 
about stability in the Balkans and helping a country with internal 
problems potentially precarious for the whole region”.
23
 The Greek 
position on FYROM was not easy to communicate, as it challenged the 
right of the country to self-determination, which of course was 
completely incomprehensible to foreign audiences, not to mention a 
breach of human rights. Perception of messages is quite delicate in 
communication per se, let alone when foreign policy is involved. So, it is 
debateable whether Greek positions became clear to foreign audiences 
when arguing that “Macedonia is Greek”. It sounds more like 
irredentism towards FYROM, rather than expressing an identity, as the 
Greeks wanted to illustrate. It was when Greece accepted the composite 
name, around 2007, that she actually started having listeners to its 
views.
24
 
From a communication’s point of view, managing FYROM’s bid for NATO 
membership in NATO’s Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 is viewed as a 
success.
25
 Foreign policy decision on de facto vetoing FYROM’s 
membership, unless an agreement on the name was achieved, had 
already been announced at the official statements of the newly elected 
(2007) Karamanlis government. Messages from abroad pointed to 
FYROM becoming accepted as a member. So, Greece needed to 
implement a campaign that would a) inform international public opinion 
on its positions and b) try to influence to its favour ambivalent countries. 
Press offices (including the Bucharest press office), embassies and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were successfully coordinated to provide 
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international public opinion through foreign correspondents and 
interviews with Greek views. Antonaros notes that one-page articles 
appeared in major international newspapers in Bucharest presenting 
Greek arguments in a clear coherent way. “This way proved successful 
and won the support of Greek position by our NATO counterparts”.
26
  
The mobilisation and cooperation of all competent bodies proved that 
there is a mechanism in place. However, there are no institutional bonds 
between the bodies that would be automatically put in place when 
needed. Managing FYROM’s bid for NATO membership was a successful, 
but ad hoc communication campaign.  
In the course of these years, Greece has done very little to reach public 
opinion in other countries. And when it did, foreign audiences had no 
way of associating themselves to Greece’s concerns. In order to support 
a cause one has first to understand it, associate with it, find a common 
ground by sharing similar concerns, needs and values. Only then it is 
possible to be receptive and supportive. Greece, has adopted a rather 
rigid, one-sided approach leaving little room for success.  
 
6. Communicating Greek foreign policy to the Greek public 
This paper is concerned with how foreign policy positions are 
communicated to foreign publics. However, it is worth referring to how 
Greek foreign policy positions are communicated to the Greek public as 
well. Communicating foreign policy to the Greek public is in many ways 
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connected to communication abroad and thus can be an indication of 
why Greece has invested so little in communication abroad.  
Informing national publics on foreign policy is not a matter of public 
diplomacy but of public affairs. In Greece, informing domestic public 
opinion on international matters concerning the country is a 
competence of the Secretariat General of Information and 
Communication.
27
  
The rhetoric of right and wrong has been reproduced in Greece as much 
as it has been promoted abroad. The Greek public, especially in the case 
of Turkey, has been embedded with hostile images of the “Other”, which 
remain still very strong (Millas 2001). Moreover, to the Greek public 
‘compromise’ is a word with very negative connotations. So the public is 
very hostile to the idea of compromise. What is considered as a desired 
outcome in international affairs, in Greece it equals national treason.
28
 
For instance, an agreement with Turkey on the territorial waters, e.g. 
with selective expansion from 6 (present status) to 8 and 12 miles 
depending on the area, would be received by the public as a sell-out. 
Therefore, negotiated agreements at the highest level cannot be 
communicated to the Greek public.
29
 Similar is the situation concerning 
FYROM’s name. A composed name was unthinkable in Greece at the 
beginning of the 1990s, but it is the official position nowadays.  
Foreign policy in Greece is heavily emotionalised. It suffices to say that 
foreign policy issues are called “national issues’. The term itself is 
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problematic in communication. Popularism is deeply implanted in Greek 
public opinion or as Tsoukalis puts it “in Greece, both communication 
and politics, is dominated by the “inland”, i.e. a deeply ethnocentric part 
of society, read patriotic, which has poor understanding of the 
international environment”.
30
 As a result, compromise in foreign policy is 
difficult to achieve and equally difficult to convey to public opinion, 
without significant political cost.  
Both domestically and internationally, Greece has followed a rigid path 
in communicating its foreign policy: the ethnocentric rhetoric juxtaposed 
with limited outreach to international public opinion has led to 
ignorance and confusion about Greek foreign policy positions.  
 
7. Suggestions for a foreign policy communication plan 
This paper has tried to identify and describe the relation between 
communication and foreign policy in Greece. It has been shown that 
communicating foreign policy positions abroad has not paid much 
attention to international public as a target audience and 
communication has been largely limited to ad hoc reactions to specific 
events. There is no long-term communication policy, which could be 
realised through a three-level public diplomacy strategy. However, there 
are steps to be made towards enforcing communication of foreign policy 
abroad. 
The research showed that there are no patterns or models of 
communicating foreign policy abroad. This does not change under 
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different governments. It is explained by the absence of structures and 
functioning mechanisms that would coordinate implicated actors. What 
research has actually shown is that communicating foreign policy is 
purely a matter of luck, for it is almost exclusively depended on 
individuals. So it is a matter of the right person in the right place at the 
right time.  
Communicating foreign policy more effectively means a fundamental 
change in the way foreign policy works today, in terms of structure, 
operation and content. In other words, it needs a communication 
strategy, i.e. an organised set of activities that would allocate 
responsibilities to and coordinate relevant state bodies, decide on the 
message of communication and the context in which foreign policy 
would be promoted and suggest means of action. Predominant should 
be the role of public diplomacy. 
 
8. Structures  
It has become evident from the analysis that Greece is in short of the 
required structures to effectively communicate its foreign policy.  
There is immediate need for evaluation of the existing structures, 
resources and personnel the state has at its disposal and wishes to 
commit to this cause. Two are the major state bodies engaging in 
communication and foreign policy; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with 
the Information and Public Diplomacy Department and the Secretariat 
General of Information & Communication with the Press Offices located 
in selected European countries, the US, China, Australia and the Middle 
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East, which have long practiced public diplomacy
31
 and at times they are 
better equipped and manned than the Embassies.
32
 
These two bodies need to merge.   Press Officers and Press Offices 
should move under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
Department of Information and Public Diplomacy. The Secretariat 
General of Information and Communication will be then abolished.
33
 In 
turn, this merge would solve practical but substantial problems such as 
a) overlapping of responsibilities and b) lack of central planning. 
Although within the competences of the Press Offices is the “information 
of the international public opinion and the media on national issues and 
the political, economic, cultural and social developments in the country, 
the promotion of the positions of the country abroad and the contacts 
with media representatives”,
34
 the Greek Embassies should, among 
other things, “inform the governments of other countries and the public 
opinion makers and initiate actions for the promotion and support of 
matters of Greek interest”.
35
 Moving the Secretariat under the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs would improve cooperation, but it is necessary to 
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establish a mechanism charged with communication policy planning. 
That would also allow better coordination with other relevant 
institutions (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Development 
etc.). This mechanism would develop communication policy based on 
the three-level dimension of public diplomacy and provide guidelines on 
implementation. Having identified the growing need for global outreach, 
establishing a mechanism for public diplomacy in the form of a 
committee has been put forward by the Union of Press Officers (ENAT) 
already in 2008.
36
 ENAT recommends the creation of a Greek Strategic 
Committee for Public Diplomacy with executive and operating 
competences, saving special role for the Secretariat of Information and 
Communication and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Provided that the 
Secretariat is merged with the Ministry this body would be administered 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with central role of the Department of 
Information and Public Diplomacy. It would have a decisive rather than a 
mere consultative role and would be the government’s advisor on public 
diplomacy issues.  
Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Information and Public 
Diplomacy Department, although charged with informing foreign publics 
on issues of foreign policy, in practice it supports the work of the 
Spokesperson of the Ministry (Papakonstantinou 2005: 82). The 
Directorate of Services Abroad and the Directorate of Public Relations of 
the Secretariat General of Information and Communication aim at 
covering this discontinuity (ibid).  In a future merge of the Secretariat 
with the Ministry, the Department of Information and Public Diplomacy 
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will be responsible for promoting Greek foreign policy to both 
international and domestic audience. It would be organised on two axes, 
one addressing the Greek public (i.e. charged with public affairs) and the 
second having global outreach (public diplomacy). Since informing 
foreign and domestic publics is the major role performed by the 
Secretariat General of Information and Communication
37
, transferring 
these competences in the Department of Information and Public 
Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not pose serious 
problems.  
Finally, the range of initiative within the Embassies should be increased. 
The current practice does not leave to the Embassies much room for 
manoeuvre, although they should be playing an important role in the 
promotion of foreign policy positions, because they have a much better 
picture of the social, economic and political being of the country of duty, 
as well as of the human attributes and living patterns which mould the 
society. Inevitably, the role of Press Officers and diplomats becomes 
more demanding, since they would need to engage in more initiatives, 
craft policy plans and become more exposed to the public. An evaluation 
system should be also put in place, delivered to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, in order to measure the utility of the practices used, identify 
gaps and address possible issues.  
Last but not least, there is the question of funding public diplomacy 
activities. This should be done by cutting on the defence budget. Greece 
should be a ‘soft power’ rather than a ‘hard power’ state. Greece has 
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one of the highest military expenditures among NATO countries. In 
2009, Greece came only second to the US, followed by Turkey.
38
 Greece 
should reallocate these resources to public diplomacy training, cultural 
and business activities abroad and promotion of a positive image of the 
country.  
 
9. Operation  
Operation refers to how foreign policy will be communicated. Foreign 
policy is communicated both by diplomats and by press officers but to 
different audiences and with different means. Informing the Greek 
public on foreign policy is equally important. 
Media outreach is central to the activities of both domestically and 
internationally oriented communication policies. The way foreign policy 
is reported in the media has immediate impact on the perception of the 
public about foreign policy. So it is important, especially with regards to 
the third level of public diplomacy (relationship building) to establish 
long-lasting relations with the media, both printed and electronic. 
Besides, certain type of media can serve as excellent means for public 
diplomacy: ‘public diplomacy is most easily conveyed on TV and is most 
instantaneously seen’ (O’Heffernan 1991: 55). In the era of globalised 
networks, special emphasis should be put on the Internet too. When 
media is concerned, all three dimensions of public diplomacy become 
relevant and equal attention should be paid to explaining foreign policy 
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both to domestic and foreign media (Nye 2008: 101). Also, the media is a 
continuous source of information about social, economic and political 
reality of foreign countries that can assist public diplomacy 
development. Finally, face to face contact and in depth information on 
foreign policy positions is important in public diplomacy. It creates 
credibility between the parties and develops trust. 
Secondly, knowing the audience is important. Exchange of information 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassies is vital. The 
Embassies should provide information on the culture, values and ideas 
of the society in question and make sincere efforts to understand it. One 
of the major mistakes of US public diplomacy after 9/11 was that the 
Bush administration did not care about learning the societies it affected 
with its policies (in Rashid 2009: LVI). Also, the Embassies would provide 
the Ministry with feedback on the image the country holds for Greece 
and thus identify areas where attention should be paid in order to 
change a possible negative view to a positive one. In addition, it should 
identify the views of public opinion with regards to Greek foreign policy 
goals.  
Third, public diplomacy should target countries within Greece’s interest, 
namely countries with which either it shares interests or it is competitive 
and hence it needs to know better. Leonard makes a clear distinction 
between ‘co-operative’ and ‘competitive’ public diplomacy and how they 
should be developed (2002: 22-30). Therefore, Greece is interested in 
what Turkey does in its own areas of foreign policy, but also in the area 
of culture or tourism. As Melissen put it: ‘the “power of the better 
argument” should be considered integral to the concept of public 
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diplomacy…diplomatic argumentation should be a matter of conviction, 
resulting from and resulting in the transference of genuine belief 
grounded in understanding of the issues and knowledge of the facts’ 
(2005: 71). 
Fourth, public relations activities have enormous potential as means of 
public diplomacy. Indeed, with regards to the second and third 
dimension of public diplomacy, namely the proactive public diplomacy 
and long-term relationship building, public relations are crucial in 
communicating messages, promoting agendas and reaching audiences. 
Fifth, public diplomacy should engage all possible actors that could 
contribute to promoting the positions of the country’s foreign policy. 
Apart from the ones mentioned already (the media and the public), 
there is a variety of other actors that could be engaged: the academia 
and think tanks, selected communication experts and the Greek diaspora 
could all play a part, with one way or another and depending on their 
competences, to serve public diplomacy’s goals.  
 
10. Content 
Greece has been quite ‘rigid’ in how it has chosen to pursue its foreign 
policy goals. This means that it has shown short-sightedness and has not 
tried to accommodate concerns of others, and thus, it often offered 
problems rather than solutions. This is the case both concerning 
relations with Turkey and the name of FYROM. Greece is also a small 
country and its foreign policy interests may not concern others except 
Greece. This is why Greece should try to accommodate its foreign policy 
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concerns within a larger agenda and be more flexible in its approach. 
Differently put, it should try to enlarge the pie rather than divide the 
pieces. The example of clandestine migration coming from Turkey is a 
case in point. It took far too long for the European Union through 
FRONTEX to become involved in what is in essence an EU security policy 
matter, but that of course was not solely EU’s fault. It was also a 
problem of Greek foreign policy in failing to create channels of 
communication of the problem to European audiences. 
This narrow-mindedness in foreign policy has been costly for its goals. 
The need to enlarge Greek foreign policy agenda and include ‘low 
politics’ issues have been long acknowledged,
39
 as has the need to reach 
to the public. Tsoukalis describes this openness as “getting out of our 
shell”.
40
  Adopting an expanded view in certain issues of foreign policy 
does not mean a change in the goals of foreign policy per se. It simply 
means a change of approach in pursuing them; and such basically 
includes embracing the needs and addressing the concerns of others. It 
also means to actively participate in European political and economic 
developments. As Leonard names it, Greece should ‘prove its relevance’ 
(2002: 52) for others to listen to what it has to say. 
Finally, foreign policy messages should be conveyed in a way that is 
understandable to others; “it does not matter what you say, but what 
the others understand”.
41
 Labels such as ‘national issues’, when referring 
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to foreign policy matters obstruct communication and relationship 
building rather than creating willing audiences. The message should be 
clear, consistent domestically and abroad, repetitive and put in context 
for people to comprehend it. 
 
11. Conclusion   
It has been the point of this paper that Greek foreign policy is in need of 
a communication policy in the form of public diplomacy. By engaging 
international audience to promote foreign policy Greece enlarges its 
perspectives and participates more dynamically in political and 
economic developments. Public diplomacy, especially through its third 
dimension – relationship building – can create or enhance a certain 
image of a country in the long term. The image and perception others 
have of a country play a vital role on its standing internationally. To that, 
the people of the country influence dramatically the country’s image. As 
Anholt very bluntly but realistically puts it ‘the people are the brand’ […] 
the people and their education, abilities and aspirations […] ultimately 
make the place what it is’ (2007: 75).  
Furthermore, the image of a country is subject to change; nevertheless, 
it is associated with certain values and ideas, which traditionally fuel its 
image. Greece’s image since 2011 has suffered severe damage due to 
the financial crisis. However, its ancient history and culture, which have 
formed its identity and have exerted influence worldwide, will continue 
to be a source of invigorating the country’s image.  
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Public diplomacy is closely bound to a country’s image, policies and 
reputation, or as Anholt defines it (2007), its ‘competitive identity’. The 
use of public diplomacy lies in the power it has to affect the background 
reputation of a country, especially through communication campaigns 
and relationship building. Greece should decide on the image it wishes 
to promote, taking into account the image it has created - before the 
financial crisis – as well as the image it wishes to renounce, combined 
with its foreign policy priorities and objectives. At the end of the day, 
communication can hardly be separated from foreign policy, ‘public 
diplomacy is as much a communication phenomenon as a political one’ 
(L’Etang 2009: 613). One follows the other. The problem in Greece has 
been that communication has not been following or in any way linked to 
foreign policy, therefore promoting foreign policy goals has been 
difficult. Building a new image for the country, for which is in great need 
because of the financial crisis, will eventually support its foreign policy 
goals. However, in order to do that strong political will and wide social 
acceptance is required, which are impossible to achieve without a 
change of culture. 
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Appendix 
Public diplomacy and common misperceptions 
Public diplomacy and public affairs: Public affairs have lately been called 
‘domestic public diplomacy’ (Melissen 2005: 8). Public diplomacy 
addresses foreign audiences, while public affairs deal with informing and 
promoting a country’s policies – of either domestic or international 
character – to the national public. The audience of public affairs is 
national rather than international. Public affairs activities are also 
managed by the ministry of foreign affairs.  
Public diplomacy and propaganda: Propaganda is one-way 
communication, while public diplomacy is a two-way communication 
process. In public diplomacy, the target audience consciously 
participates in the process of communication. The third dimension of 
public diplomacy illustrates its difference from propaganda, since 
propaganda leaves no space for dialogue or relationship building on 
equal terms. It aims at penetrating and influencing the audience’s sub-
conscious level of perception, leaving no room for active thinking.   
Nation branding and public diplomacy: These two concepts are better 
distinguished by their aim. The purpose of nation branding is to 
(re)shape and (re)structures the whole identity of a state (Dinnie 2008), 
while public diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy aiming at 
gaining support of foreign policy positions by building long-term bonds 
between respective countries. Nation branding aims at defining a 
country and associating it with certain recognisable connotations (for 
example identifying Greece with environmental protection or peace 
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keeping instead of ancient history and culture). Public diplomacy and 
nation branding often get mixed up. If a nation manages to brand itself 
well and preserve this image in time, it might aid public diplomacy goals, 
but under no circumstances does it guarantee any success. Even if a 
nation remains a good brand but its foreign policy choices are viewed 
with mistrust, the brand will not suffice to influence the publics. It may 
assist in other areas, where nation branding is strong, such as tourism, 
trade, investment etc. but its effect on foreign policy is questionable. 
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